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Abstract
This paper investigates a variety of scenarios in
which control signals utilized in high-voltage DC
(HVDC) modulation are subjected to oscillatory error
due to GPS spoofing of phasor measurement unit
(PMU) time synchronization. The result of this
spoofing is the presence of forced oscillations in a
system through HVDC modulation due to cyclic
erroneous measurements. These scenarios are tested in
the Kundur two-area system with a supplementary
HVDC line which utilizes various supplementary
controllers for modulation. The simulation results are
examined for system transient behavior as well as for
the observable small-signal effects of the GPS spoofed
control signals across the system. It is found that the
harmonics of the spoofed control signal frequencies
can interact with the inter-area modes of the system,
resulting in resonant oscillations and the severity of
the oscillations is dependent upon the magnitude of the
time-error and the damping levels of the system modes.

1. Introduction
Most of the long-distance power transfer that
occurs across the grid occurs over high-voltage AC
(HVAC) transmission lines. The remaining power
transmission infrastructure consists of HVDC
transmission lines which may be utilized for purposes
ranging from power transfer between two
unsynchronized systems, to improving stability across
a region due to its ability to modulate power flow
between its endpoints. This modulation of the HVDC
flow is typically achieved using a supplementary
controller, which allows the HVDC link to provide
improvements to damping of AC system oscillations,
transient stability, and voltage support [1]. While early
implementations of HVDC modulation can be found
within the western interconnection as early as the
1970’s [2], the invention of phasor measurement units
(PMUs) in the following decade could permit the usage
of phase angle difference across remote HVDC
terminals as a feasible control input for HVDC
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modulation. Such HVDC modulation methods have
been proposed such as in [3]. Recently there has been
a major effort to develop and implement phase angle
difference based HVDC control modulation for the
Pacific DC Intertie (PDCI) in [4] for small-signal
stability benefits.
As new technologies proliferate throughout the
industry and become more integrated into new control
methods, the topics of grid security and reliability
increasingly include questions about cybersecurity and
reliability of the information upon which control
actions are taken. The wide adoption of PMUs
throughout
the
grid
provides
tremendous
improvements in system visibility and facilitates
operations and control methods which were impossible
prior to their creation. A key piece of data which
PMUs depend upon to serve their purpose, namely
GPS time synchronization data, is something that has
the potential to be compromised and can in turn cause
deleterious effects. Of the possible types of possible
GPS spoofing that may occur, spoofing that produces
an oscillatory error is of particular interest in the
context of oscillatory stability due to its potential for
resonant interaction with system modes. The focus of
this paper is the examination of the possible effects of
GPS spoofing on oscillation monitoring and oscillation
damping in a simulated case containing an HVDC line
utilizing PMU acquired voltage angle measurements as
control input.

2. GPS Spoofing Test Signals
Devices that utilize a GPS signal are susceptible to
interference from jamming or spoofing attacks which
may range in their complexity from simple to
sophisticated. As the focus of this paper is the effect of
spoofing, a fundamental description is detailed in [5] of
how such interference can affect the time
synchronization of a GPS device. From here, we
proceed on the assumption that an attempt at spoofing
a GPS signal used by a PMU has occurred successfully
and is tailored to impact the target device on relevant
time scales. In the context of power system stability
our focus is on inter-area oscillations, therefore the
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type of spoofing investigated here involve cyclic
oscillatory signals.
As inter-area modes are known to typically be well
below 1 Hz [2], the frequencies chosen for the test
spoofed signals were 0.25 Hz, 0.33 Hz, and 0.50 Hz.
An appropriate amplitude for the spoofed signals,
meaning the amount of phase shift implied by the
oscillatory spoofed signal, was determined using the
following assumptions and information:
•
Signal delay from a GPS satellite at an
altitude of 20,000 km (directly overhead) is
approximately 66.67 ms.
•
For a 60 Hz grid, a measurement timing
differential of 1 ms implies a differential in phase angle
measurement of 21.6°.
•
Time synchronization of the PMU occurs in 1
second intervals.
Desiring a spoofed amplitude corresponding to
<1% deviation from our assumed satellite altitude
which would also result in a phase angle differential
much lower than 21.6°, an amplitude change of ±5°
was chosen, which corresponds to a satellite signal
delay of 0.2315 ms (or 0.347% altitude error). This
error magnitude can be chosen to be sufficiently small
to go undetected by the internal sanity checks within
the GPS clocks and PMU devices depending on
specific vendors and the value of ±5° is used in this
paper for illustration. The magnitude of the resulting
forced system oscillations will vary mostly linearly
with the time-error magnitude as shown later in
Section 4.3.
Since the timing error can only be introduced in
one-second intervals during the GPS time
synchronization stage, the spoofed waveforms in the
timing error signal are modeled to undergo discrete
changes every one second in our studies. Accordingly,
approximations of sinusoidal oscillations by discrete
waveforms that change every one second are plotted in
Figure 1 along with the corresponding sinusoidal
oscillations that they emulate. The simulated signals
were generated by a user defined model [6] within the
transient simulation software TSAT [7].

3. Simulation cases and methods
The simulation case for this paper extends work on
a two-area system from [3], which has been modified
from its original specifications in [1] to include a
HVDC line between the two areas as illustrated in
Figure 2. The net power transfer from Area 1 to Area 2
totals 400 MW, divided in half across the HVAC tie
lines and HVDC line.

Figure 1. Waveforms of simulated spoofed signal errors
and the sinusoidal oscillations they emulate: a) 0.25Hz error,
b) 0.33 Hz error, c) 0.50 Hz error

Figure 2. Kundur system with HVDC line
The effects on the system of GPS spoofing with
various controllers are examined by simulation of a
three-phase line fault between bus 7 and bus 8 on the
green line shown in Figure 2. The fault in the transient
simulation occurs at time t = 1 second and is cleared
after 0.1 sec. The simulation continues with the line
remaining out until t = 21 seconds at which point the
line is restored and the simulation continues up to t =
40 seconds.
The input signal for the tested controllers is a phase
angle difference between bus 7 and bus 9. The set of
signal modifications made upon either measurement
includes 0.25 Hz, 0.33 Hz, and 0.50 Hz. The set of
HVDC modulation controllers tested includes a
proportional controller as implemented in [8] and
phase lead compensation of 30°, 60°, 90°, and 120°, as
proposed in [3]. The suite of scenarios tested is
comprised of the combination of those two sets where
the spoofed signal is applied to the bus 7 measurement.
Additional cases are also examined where spoofing is
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applied to measurements at both buses 7 and 9,
referred to as combined cases. A diagram of the GPS
spoofing affecting the measurement at either bus, as
well as the controller block diagrams, are given in
Figure 3.

Figure 3. Control inputs (left) and block diagrams (right) for
proportional and lead compensation controllers for HVDC
modulation.

For phase lead compensation of 30°, 60°, 90°, and
120° the controller contains N = 1, 2, 3, or 4 stages of
the phase compensation block with T1 = 0.5513 and
T2 = 0.1838. The washout block time constant is Tw =
10 seconds and the output limits are ± 20% of the
scheduled HVDC flow. Proportional gain kp is set to
be 1.
To glean relevant insights of the system’s behavior
under the test scenarios laid out, an approach was taken
to run transient simulations for each scenario and
subsequently apply modal analysis methods to the data
generated. The transient response of the system was
simulated using TSAT [6], which provides various
time series values across the system. Two main
measures were chosen for examining the transient and
modal properties of the system: real power-flow across
the HVDC line and HVAC line between bus 7 and bus
8, and the voltage phase angle values at each bus in the
system. The two simulated real power line flows are
examined to gain some insight into the practical effects
of each scenario on the system while the angle data
was used for modal analysis, the results of both are
detailed in the following section.
The time series data representing voltage phase
angle across all buses in the system is used for modal
analysis in Event Analysis Offline (EAO) software [9].
The data for each scenario is reconstructed using
several modal analysis methods including Prony’s
method [10], Hankel Total Least Square (HTLS) [3],
Matrix Pencil (MP) [11], and an eigensystem
realization algorithm (ERA) [12]. The time series data
from simulation spans the pre-fault, fault-on, and postfault states of the system as well as the time after the
line is restored. As the state of the system is not
homogeneous for time windows containing any of
these transitions the selection of different windows was
necessary for the analysis methods to yield meaningful

results. The accuracy of these different windows was
verified by comparison of FFT of the input data to the
reconstructions yielded from these methods and will be
expanded upon in the following section.

4. Simulation Results and Analysis
The frequency and damping of the interarea mode
of the two-area test system are both affected by the
different controllers implemented, as well as changes
in topology like the loss of a line in the simulation
transient case. To provide context for the results in this
section the frequency and damping ratio of the
interarea
mode
with
different
controller
implementations are given in Table 1, reflective of the
steady state system. Only a select subset of numerical
results is presented here.
Table 1. Effect of HVDC modulation controllers on interarea mode.

Controller
No control
Proportional
30° Lead
60° Lead
90° Lead
120° Lead

Frequency
(Hz)
0.623
0.637
0.647
0.664
0.687
0.745

Damping
(%)
1.284
0.532
1.54
4.778
13.635
19.114

Relative
Energy (%)
100
100
100
100
100
100

4.1. Transient simulation results
Data was collected on the real power flow across
the HVDC line and HVAC line 7-8 as a starting point
for assessing the oscillation damping performance of
the system tested. The plots in Figure 4 show the
oscillation of real power flow across the HVAC line 78 given different controllers in non-spoofed
measurement cases.
The 90° and 120° phase lead compensators were
found in [3] to provide the best oscillation damping in
non-spoofed testing, using tie line flow and phase
angle difference as respective control inputs (as
confirmed with the bottom plot in Figure 4). As such,
the effects of those two and the proportional controller
on HVAC tie line flow oscillations are shown in Figure
5 for the various spoofed signals considered. The range
of the real power swings across the HVAC line 7-8 as
well as HVDC line for the cases shown are given in
Table 2.
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inter-area mode frequency and spoofed frequency
being very close, in combination with the fact that the
modulation output signal is a supplementary control
signal for the HVDC system rather than a hard output
limit. While the magnitude of the dynamic range of
HVDC power flow is only slightly beyond the
expected modulation range, this is an effect of the GPS
spoofing in which a part of the system is caused to
operate outside its expected range.

Figure 4. Transient inter-area real power flow with nonspoofed control signals.

Table 2. Magnitudes of real power flow dynamic range
during post-fault period (from 1 to 21 seconds in simulation)
PMU Meas.
Unmodified
0.25 Hz error
0.33 Hz error
0.50 Hz error

Line
Proportional 90˚ Lead 120˚ Lead
AC78 (MW)
103.5
37.7
38.2
HVDC (MW)
13.7
26
38.9
AC78 (MW)
112.1
34
48.6
HVDC (MW)
24.3
38.6
38.4
AC78 (MW)
111.2
43.4
59
HVDC (MW)
21.3
33
38.4
AC78 (MW)
147.2
57.5
140.3
HVDC (MW)
28.2
29.2
43.3

It is clear from the data in Table 2 that there is a
notable impact on real power flow due to the effect of
GPS spoofing on the HVDC modulation. The values
presented in the table show the range of the largest
oscillation during the post-fault period prior to the line
being restored. Additionally, it is worth noting that the
case involving 0.50 Hz spoofed error and the 120° lead
compensator exceeds the range of the HVDC power
modulation output limits (± 20MW). The observation
of this swing is likely the result of the interaction of the

Figure 5. Transient inter-area real power flow with
spoofed control signals.

Testing was done for spoofing of the angle
measurement at bus 9 as well which yielded results that
were generally consistent with those presented for the
spoofing at bus 7. Two combined cases yielded
significant real power dynamic swings across line 7-8
for combined scenarios involving a 0.50 Hz error at
bus 7 and a 0.25 Hz error at bus 9. These two cases,
which implemented either the 30° or 120° lead
compensators, resulted in real power swings during the
post-fault state of 140.29 MW and 100.72 MW
respectively. Plots of these transient cases are shown in
Figure 6.
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within the testing of [6] and verification of the
soundness of the simulation case. The data for the
entry denoted with {2} was obtained from a window of
t = 25 to t = 35 seconds which reveals three modes,
two of which appear to be caused by the spoofed signal
error. One is identified with a frequency 0.652 Hz and
4.802% damping which is the interarea mode, while
the other two have frequencies of 0.332 Hz (with RE <
5%, not listed in table) and 0.666 Hz, both with
effectively 0% damping, which are the forced
oscillations caused by spoofing. It appears that the
second harmonic of the spoofed signal error contains
the highest RE.
Table 3. Modal analysis results for system test cases
PMU
status

Controller

Freq. (Hz)

Damping (%)

No error

Proportional
30° Lead
60° Lead
90° Lead
120° Lead {1}

0.635
0.647
0.664
0.687
0.745
0.634
0.250
0.647
0.665
0.672
0.738
0.791
0.750
0.666
0.334
0.652
0.666
0.652
0.662
0.671
0.865
0.666
0.635
0.5
0.647
0.502
0.657
0.500
0.679
0.508
0.573
0.500
0.644
0.493
0.247
0.647
0.501
0.754
0.247

0.532
1.540
4.778
13.635
19.114
0.619
-0.006
1.155
2.649
8.796
-0.063
13.764
-0.086
1.293
0.804
0.413
0.137
4.805
12.589
0.384
19.469
-0.054
0.526
0.011
1.41
-0.723
4.326
-0.024
12.413
0.721
10.459
0.061
0.565
-0.448
-0.042
15.993
-0.224
0.155
-0.887

Proportional
0.25 Hz
Error

Figure 6. Transient inter-area power flow with spoofed

control signal of 0.50 Hz at bus 7 and 0.25 Hz at bus 9

90° Lead
120° Lead *
Proportional

4.2. Analysis of system response
Modal analyses were conducted on each case tested
to identify the characteristics of the system response to
the spoofed control signals. Any modes identified with
a relative energy (RE) of 5% or higher were recorded
in set presented in Table 3. The data presented in the
table is the result of Matrix Pencil analysis method
specifically. The results from MP were checked for
consistency with results from other engines such as
HTLS and ERA.
The simulation data examined for the results in
Table 3 were obtained using a window from t = 22 sec
to t = 29 sec, however data in entries with an asterisk
(*) were obtained with a ‘two-window’ method. The
damping ratios given in the table which appear
negative, but near zero, bear out to be a consequence of
the analysis of the specific window selected and are not
truly negatively damped. This is verified by twowindow analysis as well as extended simulation of an
additional 60 seconds beyond line restoration.
The entry denoted with {1} is for the substantial
increase in interarea mode frequency over that of other
controllers. Acceptance of the values for frequency and
damping for this entry is supported by similar increases

30° Lead
60° Lead

30° Lead
0.33 Hz
Error

60° Lead {2}
90° Lead {3}
120° Lead *
Proportional
30° Lead

0.50 Hz
Error

60° Lead
90° Lead
120° Lead *
Proportional

Combined
Error

90° Lead {4} *

Relative Energy
(%)
100
100
100
100
100
92.71
5.99
98.78
97.62
91.46
8.54
100 (t=22-25)
57.69 (t=30-38)
87.68
9.34
100
83.54
14.88
91.27
8.73
59.56 (t=22-25)
64.71 (t=30-38)
84.98
15.02
94.84
5.160
89.52
10.48
85.72
14.29
100 (t=22-25)
100 (t=30-38)
74.73
17.91
6.09
97.33 (t=21-25)
67.61 (t=30-38)
26.36 (t=30-38)
6.04 (t=30-38)

The entry {3} identifies a harmonic of the forced
oscillation (spoofed signal) within the window from t =
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22 to t = 29 seconds. A further window from t = 30 to t
= 38 seconds identifies the forced oscillation of 0.333
Hz and its harmonic of 0.667 Hz, both with 0%
damping, however the interarea mode fails to be
identified distinctly from the harmonic. Finally, the
entry {4} finds both forced oscillations of 0.247 Hz
and 0.50 Hz, as well as the third harmonic of the 0.25
Hz signal, within a window from t = 30 to t = 38
seconds, all with 0% damping. The original simulation
data and reconstructed signals are compared by FFT to
assess the accuracy of the signal reconstructions and
the modal analysis results. Figure 7 contains the plots
of the FFTs for cases {2}, {3}, and {4}.

system mode and dominates the closed loop system
responses in Table 3. As is the case for the second
harmonic of the 0.25 Hz spoofed input, the 0.50 Hz
spoofed case does not present a strong resonance
effect, owing to it not being close to the 0.67 Hz
system mode [13].

4.3. Sensitivity to time error magnitude
The initial assumption of a successful attack
affecting the system with an oscillatory error of ±5°
serves well as a basis for a severe case. However, the
sensitivity of the system to subtler attacks should also
be considered. A more detailed examination of system
sensitivity could be conducted in future work, but
within the scope of this paper a demonstration of the
effects of increasing error amplitude were explored for
a single case for illustrative purposes. The values
presented in Table 4 are for a 30° lead compensator
controller under the impact of a 0.33Hz spoofed
oscillation. The real power fluctuations examined were
from tie line 7-8 once the system reached a stable limit
cycle (from 140 to 200 seconds).
Table 4. Real power fluctuation values for various
spoofed error amplitudes

Error Amplitude (°±) Max Power (MW) Min Power (MW) Diff. (MW)
0.811
100.935
100.124
0.10
2.03
101.537
99.507
0.25
98.485
4.041
0.50
102.526
8.061
1.00
104.505
96.444
16.112
108.457
92.345
2.00
32.519
116.473
83.954
4.00

Figure 7. FFTs of original and reconstructed voltage
angle at bus 7 for 0.33 Hz case with 60° lead comp. {2}, 90°
lead comp. {3}, and combined case with 90° lead comp. {4}.
In the 0.25 Hz error cases, we see that the strongest
component in the system response is a sustained
oscillation of 0.75 Hz and 0.738 Hz for the 120° and
90° controllers, which corresponds to the third
harmonic of the 0.25 Hz spoofed input. An interaction
between the 0.75 Hz harmonic and the 0.67 Hz
interarea mode causes a resonance effect that is seen in
the system responses and is the cause of the 0.75 Hz
oscillation having a higher amplitude (represented in
RE in the modal analysis) than the 0.25 Hz forced
oscillation [13]. Similarly, for the 0.33 Hz spoofed
signal case, the second harmonic at 0.66 Hz excites the

As can be seen from the table, for the range of error
amplitudes examined (near the amplitude of interest for
this paper) there is mostly a linear relationship between
the error amplitude and the amplitude of real power
fluctuations in steady state. The increases in power
fluctuation appear to increase in a roughly linear
fashion with increases in the spoofed signal error
amplitude which emphasizes the small-signal dynamic
nature of the phenomenon.
Unlike drift attacks [5] where the time-error and the
corresponding angle error gradually increase over time,
the time-error varies within small ranges (back and
forth) for the cyclic time-error of this paper as
indicated in Figure 1. Therefore, time-error induced
forced oscillations studied in this paper can possibly go
undetected for long periods of time especially at small
amplitudes causing potential damage to expensive
power system equipment and possibly leading to
unintentional tripping of system components.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper the behavior of a power system in
response to spoofed HVDC control signal during a
transient event was investigated. Based upon several
possible HVDC modulation control implementations,
three spoofed GPS signal frequencies were simulated.
The transient event simulation data revealed that the
introduction of spoofed cyclic signals to HVDC control
results in forced inter-area oscillations of varying
amplitudes which were sensitive to inter-area mode
damping ratio and the frequency of the spoofed signal.
Some combinations of controller and spoofed signal
frequency resulted in real power dynamic ranges in
excess of ±35% of the scheduled line flow, as in the
case of the 120° phase lead compensation controller
and 0.50 Hz signal spoofing at bus 7. Combined cases
were also examined in which control signals from both
ends of the HVDC link were subject to spoofing.
The sustained oscillations caused by the cyclic
time-error spoofing will persist as long as the spoofed
signal is imposed. A possible consequence of such
oscillations may be that an undesirable control action is
taken by an operator to mitigate the oscillations which
may lead to service disruptions. Alternatively, if such
oscillations do not warrant direct intervention, their
presence in the system over time may still adversely
affect power quality or cause damage to equipment
such as generator rotor shafts.
Various modal analyses were conducted on the data
sets collected which revealed resonance phenomena
due to the interaction of the spoofed signal with the
inter-area mode frequency, as well as effects related to
harmonics of the spoofed signal throughout the system.
The resonance effect can be induced by any
sufficiently high relative energy harmonic of the
spoofed signal frequency, and not the fundamental
frequency itself. This implies that for a given spoofed
input signal there can be multiple inter-area modes
which may be affected simultaneously by different
harmonics of the spoofed input. A reduction in HVAC
line flows or generator tripping are potential
consequence of such sustained oscillations.
While the simulations conducted in this paper
revealed that these undamped spoofed signals and
harmonics resulted in stable limit cycles, further
investigation is needed to determine more precisely
how these effects impact other system components or
if they result in unacceptable operational conditions
beyond the transient and small signal stability
properties examined here.
Several primary takeaways from the transient and
small signal analyses are listed as follows:

•
The spoofed cyclic timing error signals with
any controller tested cause sustained, undamped
oscillations in the system.
•
The sustained oscillations may result in
operator actions which disrupt service, or they may
cause damage to synchronous generator equipment if
they persist.
•
A harmonic of the spoofed input signal can
have resonant interactions with an inter-area mode, and
consequently different harmonics may cause resonance
with multiple interarea modes in large real systems.
While the system studied in this paper is quite
simple, a similar study on a more complex system
could yield useful insights for system operators. This
further work could also include examination of
possible ways to detect and mitigate the effects of such
attacks upon the power system.
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